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Aesthetic Mediation and the Politics of Technology: (re)New(ed) Strategies for a
Critical Social Theory
-Andrew J. Pierce
There is a rich history in early critical theory of attempting to harness the power
of aesthetic imagination for the purposes of political liberation. Both Adorno and
Marcuse pursue this project in different ways. But it has not yet been linked concretely
enough to the philosophy of technology. In advanced technological societies,
technologies often aid in and embody certain political structures of domination. This has
led some theorists to equate technology itself with domination, by way of a technical
rationality that is supposedly devoid of any moral, political, or aesthetic content. In his
recent work in the philosophy and politics of technology, Andrew Feenberg challenges
this thesis, pointing out that the reduction of technologies to their function is a theoretical
abstraction rather than a historical fact. As such, it can be understood as a technological
fetishism (analogous to commodity fetishism) which conceals rather than clarifies the
political character of concrete technologies.1 Once technologies are seen as socially
constructed and mediated, the design and social organization of technology becomes a
normative issue. That is, one can then ask, as Feenberg does, how technologies ought to
be constructed in order to best serve the interests of a democratic society. It is not my
intention to challenge this program of democratizing technology. Rather I would like to
draw out and examine a particular aspect or “initiative” within it. Technologies, as
concrete objects infused with political content, are especially appropriate for bringing
aesthetic elements into the everyday lives of their users. In the first place this is merely
the discouraging insight that aesthetically pleasing design is an important feature of
commodities in consumption-driven societies. But aesthetic aspects of technologies can
resist as well as support the status quo, and further, I will argue, aesthetic initiatives are a
vital component of resistance to technocratic (i.e. undemocratic) organizations of
technology, since the power of these technological regimes is partly symbolic. The
phenomenon of customization and personalization of technologies, although already coopted in a variety of ways, is a testament to such resistance. I begin then, by specifying
the conventional method of understanding technological domination: the differentiation
thesis. I then show how this understanding of technological development fails to grasp
the reality of technologies as they are embodied in social contexts. From the concept of
an embodied technology, I demonstrate, through an analysis of customization, that
aesthetic imagination plays an important role in politicizing technologies, and enrolling
these technologies themselves in the project of resisting the general phenomenon of
technological domination. This helps to understand what it might mean to translate the
insights of early critical theory into a contemporary critical praxis.

1

A. Feenberg. Questioning Technology. NY: Routledge, 1999. See also Feenberg’s Alternative Modernity:
The Technical Turn in Philosophy and Social Theory. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995,
and Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited. Oxford University Press, 2002.

1

1.

The Differentiation Thesis

The term ‘technology’ can be traced etymologically to the Ancient Greek term
techne, which named all forms of making, both practical and artistic.2 How then do these
terms become differentiated in modern vernaculars, and more importantly, does this
conceptual distinction correspond to a fundamental difference between expressive arts
and practical technologies? For critical theory, the differentiation of art and technology is
bound up with questions about modernity. For Marx the defining moment of modernity is
the birth of the capitalist mode of production, which wrests the economy from its social
context and attributes to it an independent logic of exchange. The economy then (not just
markets for goods and services in the abstract, but also the material technologies that
facilitate them) gains a certain artificial autonomy, such that it can be understood
according to certain “laws” which appear as natural, or intrinsic to their objects. In the
last analysis, it is these laws which govern the development of society, including its
“superstructural,” cultural aspects.
Importantly influenced by Marx, but in contrast to his interpretation of the
autonomy and fundamentality of the economy, Max Weber’s theory of modernity notes
that with modernity, the “cultural value spheres” of science, morality, and art also
achieve a certain sort of autonomy, even from the basic laws of political economy. These
value spheres are differentiated by a process of “rationalization” which attributes to each
sphere a constitutive rationality as well as a set of specialized procedures and social roles.
Questions of knowledge are now treated exclusively by scientists, in accordance with the
“value-free” (purposive rational) methods of deductive reasoning and experimentation.
Questions of justice are dealt with by trained legal experts and ethicists in accordance with
“value-rational” procedures designed to test the universal validity, consistency, and
effectiveness of norms and laws. And questions of taste are taken up, by professional artists
and art critics, in ways that further the development of creative techniques and the
appreciation of expressive values.3

Where does technology fit on this model? I take it that the idea that technology is
merely applied science has been thoroughly debunked.4 But technology does seem to
have a specific form of rationality (the principles of engineering perhaps) as well as a
specialized group of social actors (engineers, designers, and so on). It might then be seen
as having a certain autonomy as well, irreducible to its scientific, moral or aesthetic
elements. Early critical theorists like Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse took this
2
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possibility very seriously. They saw in technological societies an inherent tendency
toward domination, due to a technological attitude that reduces all questions to questions
of instrumentality, efficiency, and so on. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and
Adorno write, “knowledge, which is power, knows no limits, either in its enslavement of
creation or in its deference to worldly masters…technology is the essence of this
knowledge. It aims to produce neither concepts nor images, but method, exploitation of
the labor of others, capital.”5 Similarly, Marcuse begins his One-Dimensional Man by
asserting that “a comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom prevails in
advanced industrial civilization, a token of technical progress.”6 With these theorists, the
question of technology becomes central, but their supposed equation of domination with
rationality itself (technical rationality being just the contemporary instantiation of such a
dominating logic) leads some to think that their view amounts to an all-encompassing
pessimism, where the emancipatory potential of reason is forgotten.
Habermas in particular condemns such pessimism, and attempts to identify and
reconstruct a form of rationality capable of resisting the dominating effects of technical
rationality. But he never challenges the idea that technology is governed by an
autonomous rationality which, left unchecked, tends toward totalitarian control. Instead,
he attempts to bring technical rationality under external control, through communicative
rationality. In this way the infectious spread of the technological attitude can be
quarantined, and kept from “colonizing the lifeworld” where communicative rationality
can carry on the emancipatory legacy of the enlightenment without interference.
This brief sprint through the history of critical theory no doubt misses several
important subtleties, some of which will soon be clarified, but it suffices to bring out the
centrality of a view of technology as autonomous and inherently geared toward
domination and control. In the next section, I will present some challenges to this view,
before identifying and developing some causes for optimism in Adorno and Marcuse,
relating to the potential for liberation bound up in the aesthetic imagination.
2.

Embodied Technologies

In tracing (a version of) the differentiation thesis back to Marx and Weber, one
should not forget that they were not only sociologists, but also critics of ideology. That is,
though they identify in modernity a certain material and cultural differentiation, they also
mean to show that this differentiation is false – that it conceals a certain organic unity of
the market and the society in which it appears, of science with the values that are
supposedly irrelevant to it, and so on. The laws of the market are challenged (and strictly
speaking, refuted as laws) whenever economic imperatives run up against the resistance
of those whose lives are affected. And even scientific laws are increasingly being shown
to be insufficient for explaining the value-laden practice of science. The same can be said
of technology. Though it would be difficult to deny that a certain purely instrumentalist
logic attempts to govern technological development, this logic is not irresistible or
5
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complete. Users influence technological development in a variety of ways, from adapting
and changing the technologies to fit their own needs (like the internet), to resisting the
very implementation of certain technologies (like nuclear power). And with each
intervention, technologies are shown to be sites of resistance to the very forms of power
that they are supposed to embody.
But what is meant by an “embodied” technology? More specifically, what do
technologies embody? The answer to this question provides the refutation of the
differentiation thesis, because what is embodied in technologies is precisely what they are
supposed to have shed: moral norms, political imperatives, and (as I will show) aesthetic
initiatives. Let me begin with morals, since I think this is a more straightforward case.
Bruno Latour clearly outlines the moral imperatives embodied in technologies through
the analysis of simple, everyday technologies.7 I enter a vehicle and the seatbelt
automatically lowers over my chest. The moral imperative to ‘wear my seatbelt’ has been
“delegated” to this particular technology. The same can be said for other safety
technologies like childproof lids, but also for technologies to which courtesies like
‘please close the door’ are delegated, as in Latour’s example of the automatic door closer.
Examples like these are relatively innocuous, but more sinister examples can be given.
Langdon Winner recounts the story of Robert Moses, a powerful and prolific urban
planner in mid-twentieth-century New York City.8 His designs of bridges, highways and
housing projects embodied his own racist and classist prejudices, for example, in
overpasses that intentionally prohibited public transportation from passing under them,
thus insulating certain communities from “undesirable” visitors. Technologies like this
are “not merely the symbol of a social order that rewards some while punishing others
[they are] in a true sense an embodiment of that order.”9 How is this different from the
kind of domination that Adorno and Marcuse find inherent in technology? In the first
place, for Winner (and perhaps also Latour) the type of domination that can be embodied
in technologies is the result of certain discreet social choices and processes, and not of a
disembodied technological attitude or rationality that has gained the momentum of
history. As such, they admit of a certain range of choices or “structuring decisions”. Even
when these are limited to a yes or no position on the technology in question, the
possibility of transforming the technical infrastructure of a society must be admitted, and
the “totalitarian” character of technology as such denied.10 This brings us to the crux of
the argument.
7
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Indeed, what may have at first appeared as a similarity now appears as a stark contrast. What early
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3.

Aesthetic Mediations-Initiatives

In spite of the previous remarks, let us not cast off the contributions of early
critical theory to the philosophy of technology too quickly. It is not that the link between
technology and domination is false, but that it is incomplete. Technocratic societies might
very well tend toward a certain kind of totalitarianism. It is just that this general tendency
does not fully determine (or “enroll” to use Latour’s phrase) particular technologies as
instruments of domination, as Feenberg notes.11 This is why technologies can be sites of
resistance to the very technological attitude they are supposed to embody. Appropriately
then, Feenberg suggests a “two-level” critical theory of technology, which acknowledges
that at the level of “primary instrumentalization,” technologies are in fact wrested from
their social context and ascribed a certain objective rationality. This rationality facilitates
and embodies domination, in much the same way as the forced separation of markets
from society does. But just like the “objective” laws of economics, the “objective” laws
of technology are constitutive illusions, which never fully isolate their objects from their
concrete conditions of existence, which are social.12 Accordingly, Feenberg identifies a
secondary level of instrumentalization, where technologies are realized and integrated
into the fabric of society. This secondary level is “reflexive” in that it “treats
functionality [the fetishized product of primary instrumentalization] itself as raw material
for higher-level forms of technical action.”13 The realization of technology at this level
produces both social roles (“subjectivizations”) and “secondary” properties in the object.
“Mediations” are those properties – aesthetic, ethical, cultural – that appear as secondary
within the given technological order. “Initiatives” are those social actions that resist the
strategies of control imposed by this order including, presumably, the fetishization of
function and the corresponding relegation of aesthetic and other properties to a secondary
level. This two-level theory is the culmination of Feenberg’s critical theory of
technology, and it allows me to pose my central question in more specific terms. 1. How
can aesthetic mediations act reflexively upon technological rationality itself, in order to
transform its dominating and leveling effects? and 2. What sort of initiatives can catalyze
this process?
A recent television news story showed Iraqis programming their cell phones to
play pro-Shiite ringtones when they are in Shiite neighborhoods, so that their loyalty will
not be questioned, and their safe passage assured (or at least, made more likely). What is
happening here? A supposedly peripheral aesthetic feature of a given technology – the
ability to make one’s phone ring with one’s favorite song - is being used in innovative
and unintended ways. While one may hesitate to call this a liberating appropriation of
technology (unless one’s idea of liberation is mere survival, which should not be
shrugged off too quickly in the context of brutal chaos and disorder) it is nonetheless a
testament to a certain kind of resistance to the dominating and leveling effects of
technology. It is what I will call a democratic-aesthetic initiative. It is democratic since it
11
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is carried out by and born out of the immediate needs of a particular group of people,
rather than developed/ imposed by a hierarchically organized structure.14 It is aesthetic
since it blurs the line between primary functional properties and “secondary” aesthetic
ones (it uses the aesthetic properties of the technology for some purpose). It treats
functionality as “raw material,” but does this survival tactic constitute a “higher level
technical function”? Additional examples can clarify the point.
Customization is fast becoming a new principle of the marketing of goods and
services. If I go into an electronics store to purchase a computer, the salesperson will
likely ask me a series of questions: what do I plan to use the computer for? Work?
Entertainment? Is the computer for my home? My office? Do I enjoy playing games?
Watching movies? Am I a writer? The salesperson will then “customize” a computer for
my “unique” set of needs. Even automobile companies have begun taking advantage of
the kinds of customization that have always been linked to the symbolic aspect of vehicle
ownership. Scion, a division of Toyota Motor Corporation, invites consumers to “build
their own” Scion, from exterior appearance to interior design. One particular online ad
campaign even asks the consumer to choose a personality type, and then loads an image
of the sort of customizations that might fit that type.15 Are these examples of democratic
initiative on the part of myself and/or the salesperson? In the first place there appears to
be a kind of contradiction in the idea of pre-packaged customization and made-to-order
personalization. But Jean Baudrillard, who was one of the first to identify this
phenomenon of customization, thinks not. He sees personalization as the ideology
appropriate to capitalist consumption, complementing competition as the ideology
appropriate to capitalist production: “If we can still view consumption as an independent
activity allowing the expression of personal preferences, while on the contrary production
appears to be quite definitively planned, this is simply because the techniques of
psychological conditioning are not as developed as those of economic planning.”16 With
the incorporation of consumer preference into production itself, this thesis seems even
more compelling. If democratic initiatives exist to counteract this type of strategic
control, we must search for them outside of the realm of consumption proper.
For such a task, we will do well to remember that market-driven customization,
like all market imperatives, is parasitic upon existing social practices. So the phenomena
co-opted by market strategy should, in some cases, point to tactics and initiatives that
may have originally served to resist or transform technological and/or market rationality.
Car customization is a case in point, born out of the consumer culture of mid-century
14
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America, but importantly transforming that culture with its technical initiatives. So-called
“hot rodders” functionally transformed stock automobiles into racing machines, defying
both laws and attempts by automobile manufacturers to discourage such behavior through
cancellation of warranties, technical designs that were more difficult to manipulate, and
etc. Interestingly, the aesthetic of the hot rod came to embody this rebellious spirit,
whether or not the automobiles were actually used for racing. The practice of customizing
these vehicles blurred the lines between aesthetics and functionality, and it became
central to the development of certain communities of resistance. A particularly interesting
variation of this type of initiative is the “lowrider” automobile, initially a result of
Mexican-American communities’ appropriation of car and customization culture. Unlike
their hot-rodding Anglo-American counterparts, the lowriders didn’t care much about
racing or horsepower. Instead, “the early lowrider found that a trunk load of cement or
sandbags created a new look for the car. This was inexpensive and the amount of
lowering (in the rear only) depended on the size of the trunk and the strength of the
owners back. Soon a car with a lowered rear-end was seen as a lowrider and not an anglo
custom.”17 Perhaps even more than the hot rods, these customized vehicles became
symbolic and functional centerpieces of their communities. Archaeologist Ruben
Mendoza describes their role for the largely impoverished Chicano immigrants and steel
workers:
Without any type of job security or insurance, an illness or calamity could destroy their lives.
Many of these immigrants formed mutual aid societies, or social clubs, where they would
meet and socialize on a regular basis…they would all contribute money, and if any of them
got sick or in trouble, that money could be used to help the sick or ailing member out. The
focus of these social clubs was often a communally owned car, used by and worked on by
several families.18

This history is embodied in contemporary lowrider culture, in which lowriders (a term
referring to both the vehicle and its owner) gather together in public places, talking and
displaying their vehicles, often culminating in a sort of informal parade. Compare this
with Adorno’s cynical description of the automobile as an embodiment of technological
domination:
The making of travel aquaintance is reduced by the private automobile to half-threatening
encounters with hitchhikers. People travel on rubber tires in strict isolation from one another.
What is talked about in one family automobile is the same as in another…Just as every family
with a certain income spends the same percentage on housing, cinema, cigarettes, exactly as
statistics prescribe, the subject matter of conversations is schematized according to the class
of automobile. When they meet on Sunday outings or in restaurants, the menus and décor of
which are identical to others in the same price category, the guests find that with increasing
isolation they have become more and more alike.19
17
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What we discover is that, through democratic-aesthetic initiative, the automobile itself is
transformed from a symbol and vehicle of isolation and homogenization, into a symbol
and vehicle of resistance to these very phenomena.
Somewhat similarly, the ready-made personalization of computers draws upon
well-documented democratic initiatives on the part of users to challenge the hierarchical
structure of technological design. The open-source design movement advocates software
design that can be modified and redistributed by users. It thus resists both centralized
technocratic control and market commodification. Arguments for open source
programming often focus on function. By allowing users to modify and redistribute a
software’s code, those modifications that are deemed most useful are maintained or
selected, while those that are not are left behind. Software thus undergoes evolution and
innovation at a speed that hierarchical, commercial production cannot begin to match.
Predictably, commercial software producers have tried to figure out how to incorporate
such initiatives into a for-profit market framework, so far with little success. But the
customization of software also integrates aesthetics with functionality. An elegant and
aesthetically pleasing website or interface is often also more “user-friendly”. Further, one
user’s purely aesthetic modifications might be “selected” and enrolled for purposes
unforeseen by him or her.
Examples like these begin to fill out the concept of a democratic-aesthetic
initiative. It is important to note that their co-option and commercialization, contrary to
the pessimism of someone like Baudrillard, does not eliminate the original initiatives.
Indeed, it is often the groups who initiate such innovations that are the most fervent in
resisting the commercial bastardization of their creations. Now that we have some idea of
what a democratic-aesthetic initiative looks like, I will return to the question of why
initiatives of this type are specially suited to transform technocratic societies, not just
piecemeal, but fundamentally, thus re-enlisting aesthetic imagination for the political
tasks that early critical theory envisioned for it.
4.

Technology and Symbolic Power

It cannot be denied that the power and authority of advanced technological
societies is, in important respects, material. One need only look, for example, at the
United States’ massive military-industrial complex to see this material power at its most
brutal. However, the power of technological regimes is also significantly symbolic.
Feenberg equates this type of power with simple, premodern technological societies:
“even where a few strategic technologies, such as irrigation, are controlled from a center,
that control is generally not a material, but a symbolic power base. It is doubtful that the
farmers of ancient Mesopotamia obeyed because they feared the water being shut off;
more likely, mastery of water manifested the divinity of their rulers and made obedience
second nature.”20 But are advanced technological societies so different in this regard? In
American Technological Sublime, David Nye shows how the discourse of sublimity,
originally reserved for the awe-inspiring objects of art and, especially, nature, reemerges
around the time of the industrial revolution to account for the unprecedented

20
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achievements of human technology.21 It isn’t hard to imagine that the willingness to defer
to the authority of experts even in matters of general political will formation is an
expression of a symbolic reverence, similar in some respects to that of the ancient
Mesopotamians. The expert and the technocrat are the shamans of advanced
technological society. The democratization of technology must thus acknowledge the
symbolic, as well as material dimensions of technical power. What does this mean,
concretely?
Recall Robert Moses’ overpass. Imagine it now painted with subversive graffiti (I
will leave its message to the reader’s poetic imagination). Such an aesthetic mediation
does not essentially transform the bridge; it does not affect its function of prohibiting the
passage of public transportation. Perhaps it raises the consciousness of the community,
who then demands its removal. Or perhaps it is viewed as such a nuisance by some
authority that the bridge is removed or remodeled. But these material effects are external
to the mediation itself, which is primarily symbolic (For all the praise of the graffiti that
proliferated in Paris during the May events of 1968, we should not forget that these
symbolic initiatives were complemented by a variety of material initiatives, both the
students’ own and those of their counterparts in the factories. Without this alliance of
material and symbolic initiatives, the movement would likely have been much less
successful). This is why, for Baudrillard and others who base their theories of society on
textual or linguistic models, convincing examples of concrete structural change are often
in short supply.
But neither can a naive materialism appropriately ground the project of
democratizing technology. It cannot be denied that technologies function within a
“symbolic economy” that infuses some technologies with power regardless of function. A
college friend from Zimbabwe once expressed to me his joy at being able to pursue
whatever subjects of study he desired. I agreed, assuming naively that he was praising the
level of academic freedom he enjoyed here, relative to where he was from. ‘But no’ he
explained, ‘you must do what you study. I have only to get a degree in something.’ His
point was that, when he returned home, his American degree took on a primarily
symbolic value. He could major in philosophy and obtain a job in civil engineering. It
mattered very little that this particular degree had little functional value for that particular
task. It signified him as intelligent, sophisticated, and therefore employable. Academic
degrees are not technologies, but technologies are imparted with symbolic power in an
analogous fashion.
For example, imagine now a public housing project (another of Moses’
endeavors). Initially a part of progressive, New Deal legislation, massive inner city public
housing underwent a process of “ghettofication” in the 1960’s and 70’s, such that highrise “projects” became associated with crime, poverty, and general social malaise. In the
language I have introduced above, oppression of minorities, economic disadvantage, and
other forms of domination became embodied in the technology of public housing.
Recognizing that these massive housing projects have largely failed in their initial aims,
urban planners have begun dismantling them, and dispersing their residents into a variety
of “mixed-income” housing developments. But difficulties have arisen for this strategy
also, due to the unwillingness of higher-income communities, market-rate renters and so
21
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on to accept former residents of public housing as their neighbors. Though the material
technology may be demolished or redesigned, its symbolic power-effects remain,
inscribed upon individuals themselves in the form of stereotypes.
So, since technological domination, taken as a whole and in its particular
instantiations, contains both a material and symbolic element, resistance to and
transformation of technology in the interests of emancipation must also have a material
and symbolic element. Let us not forget though, in speaking somewhat loosely about
separate aspects or elements, that these elements are always initially synthesized and
embodied in particular technologies. Technologies are the locations of the struggle
between systemic imperatives and democratic initiatives. The question we are finally
approaching is, why democratic-aesthetic initiatives?
In the first place, the aesthetic dimension is already symbolic, as Marcuse,
following Kant, notes.22 In art, a certain distance and independence from the prevailing
reality principle can be achieved. Adorno understands this as a kind of fetishism: “it is
this fetishism – the blindness of the art work to the reality of which it is part – that
enables the work of art to break the spell of the reality principle and to become a spiritual
essence.”23 Yet the fetishism of art, unlike the fetishism of the commodity, contains a
potential for emancipation. On this point, Marcuse and Adorno are in agreement.24
Unfortunately, neither thinker makes the implications of this thesis concrete enough.
Adorno, anticipating Baudrillard in this respect, sees technological domination as so allpervasive that aesthetic imagination becomes a kind of depoliticized safe-haven. He thus
ultimately fails to harness its power for practical purposes. Marcuse is slightly more
optimistic, but his failure to properly distinguish technology and scientific rationality
leads Habermas to reduce his project of a “new science and technology” to near
absurdity.25 And finally, Baudrillard’s approach, while initially promising, fails to
distinguish between technologies and objects/commodities in general.
By contrast, the present approach allows for the reintegration of aesthetic and
practical concerns without any grand thesis about forms of action or rationality. The
fetishization of art corresponds to and complements the fetishism of technology.
Feenberg notes that “what differentiates technology and tools in general from other types
of objects is the fact that they appear always already split into ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’
qualities, i.e., functional qualities and all others.”26 This is not an ahistorical thesis about
the essence of technology, but rather its essence or definition at a particular moment in
history – our own. Feenberg is saying that, at present, technology is defined by its
fetishization. And just like fetishized art, fetishized technology contains within itself the
potential to transform itself, to move beyond its own fetishization. This is the real
22
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meaning of a new technology. My thesis is that concrete technologies (as opposed to
technology in the abstract) must be the foci of this practical pursuit. In a concrete
synthesis of art and technology, the fetishization of both is overcome, and their
emancipatory potential can be unleashed. This synthesis displays the characteristics that
Marcuse and Adorno identify in aesthetic imagination.
In the first place it resolves, in a Hegelian moment, the opposition of subject and
object. This is a bold claim that deserves more attention than I can give it here. Let me
initially just recall an example of democratic-aesthetic initiative described above. The
“lowrider,” refers to both the technological object and the subject that “operates” it. The
identity of the subject and the character of the object are concretely synthesized. Said
another way, the initiative of the subject and the mediation of the object become
indistinguishable (I have tried throughout this essay to keep the terms distinct where
possible, but now one sees why I am often tempted to hyphenate them, as they often point
to the very same thing). No doubt this is not the exclusive domain of democratic
initiatives. Quite often in technological societies, people come to see their technologies –
their mobile phones, palm pilots, and computers – as extensions of themselves.27 But
when these technologies are outside of one’s own control – i.e., subject to strategic,
hierarchical control – they do not smoothly integrate subject and object, but result in the
kind of fractured identity characteristic of contemporary life. Witness a computer
crashing, or a mobile phone achieving its planned obsolescence. Events like these show
just how fragile the supposed synthesis is when it depends upon external controls and
operations.
Secondly, in enrolling particular technologies to act “reflexively” upon the
structure of technology itself (the technological attitude), aesthetic mediations-initiatives
synthesize abstract and particular. It is not the case then, that technologies politicized by
way of aesthetic initiatives are mere means to developing a new technological order.
They are, in fact, embodiments of that order – testaments to a new technology born
within the shell of the old. They are, in the Hegelian sense, concrete universals,
embodying not only the particular tasks and roles for which they are developed, but also
the very ideal of a democratized technological structure. These last points are, of course,
the most tentative, but if my thesis is correct, a more thorough analysis of them should
lead in positive directions for a critical theory of technology.
5.

Conclusions

In the previous pages, I have returned to some questions in early critical theory
that seem to have been eclipsed by contemporary critical theory in the Habermasian vein.
Feenberg is, of course, an exception, and his efforts should, in my view, be considered
monumental. I have tried to specify his conception of mediation-initiative, with particular
concern for the role of aesthetic imagination in transforming technology democratically.
Other programs for democratizing technology exist, but many focus exclusively on the
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material aspects of technological power, ignoring its symbolic elements.28 I believe
Feenberg’s account leaves this dimension of analysis open, despite his sometimes
ambiguous comments about the symbolic nature of technological power. Combining his
two-level model of technical action with the conception of embodied technologies allows
us to re-approach the issue of aesthetic imagination as a force for political emancipation,
an issue that remains largely unresolved in critical theory. And the analysis of
customization provides cause for optimism in unexpected domains, the very domains of
technological production – automobiles and computers – which are often taken to be
central to the dominant technological regime. Hopefully then, the long overlooked topic
of aesthetic imagination can be broached with new enthusiasm.
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